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Our Constitution contains explicit directions regarding the
organization of the federal government, dividing the responsibil-
ities of government among three separate branches, and enumer-
ating the specific powers each branch is to exercise. This division
and enumeration of powers establishes the fundamental terms
by which one branch's claim to authority may be deemed valid
or invalid, and provides the very basis for deciding whether the
exercise of power by an agent of government is permitted or pro-
hibited. Too frequently, however, commentators, both inside
and outside of government, discuss the separation of powers
found in the Constitution as if it were some kind of broad based
"constitutional policy" or political philosophy divorced from the
specific provisions in the text of the document.' This Article
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1. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Leading Cases, 100 HAav. L. REV.
100 (1986):
[The Constitution] establishes partially interdependent, separate centers of power
in order to prevent any one center from becoming tyrannical by accumulating all
judicial, legislative, and executive power. A functional separation of powers analy-
sis that examines a particular arrangement in terms of how it contributes to or
detracts from the maintenance of these desirable tensions among the three
branches best reflects the separation of powers concept.
Id. at 228 (footnotes omitted); Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REV. 109, 111 (1984) ("[T]he separation of powers doctrine
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seeks to refocus that discussion, to move away from abstractions
about separation of powers, and to re-anchor the doctrine to its
constitutional moorings.
There is nothing novel or idiosyncratic about the thesis of
this Article. Indeed, Supreme Court Justices from virtually
every generation of the Court have analyzed the constitutional
separation of powers in a similar manner.2 Nevertheless, because
[is] a nebulous principle finding no express articulation in the constitutional text.");
Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroach-
ment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 331 (1977) ("[Tjhe constitutional the-
ories of separation of powers and checks and balances ... have evolved over two hundred
years."); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional
Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977):
Separation of powers is not a doctrine in the sense of positive law; it is a political
theory concerning the system of allocation of governmental powers. It reflects the
consensus of the thirty-nine individuals who signed the Document of 1787 on what
was then perceived as the permissible limits of governmental interaction. But use
of it as a standard for judging the constitutionality of activities not foreseen is
made impossible by the fact that the Framers did not agree on what the doctrine
specifically meant. The term was not used in the tripartite division of powers. It is
merely an inference drawn from the first three articles of the Constitution.
Id. at 384-85; Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality of a
Constitutional Idea, 52 OR. L. REV. 211, 216 (1973) ("[T]he question remains whether
the doctrine [of separation of powers] is still a workable constitutional theory.");
Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 881 (3d Cir. 1986)
("[T]he separation of powers principle ...is not expressly mentioned in the Constitu-
tion but ... undergirds the Constitutional philosophy .... ").
2. The Court's entire history can be measured by the terms of office of nine Justices:
William Cushing, 1789-1810; John Marshall, 1801-1835; Roger Brooke Taney, 1836-1864;
Samuel Freeman Miller, 1862-1890; Henry Billings Brown, 1891-1906; William Rufus
Day, 1903-1922; Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1916-1939; Hugo Lafayette Black, 1937-1971;
and William Joseph Brennan, Jr., 1956-present. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CON-
GRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 795-859 (1979). Of these
nine, those who have written about the separation of powers have generally espoused the
same approach taken in this article. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (The "original and [s]upreme will [of the people] or-
ganizes the government, and a[ss]igns, to different departments, their re[s]pective pow-
ers .... The powers of the legi[s]lature are defined, and limited; and that tho[s]e limits
may not be mi[s]taken, or forgotten, the con[s]titution is written."); Gordon v. United
States, 117 U.S. 697 (1864) (Taney, C.J.):
The Constitution of the United States delegates no judicial power to Con-
gress. Its powers are confined to legislative duties, and restricted within certain
prescribed limits. By the second section of Article VI, the laws of Congress are
made the supreme law of the land only when they are made in pursuance of the
legislative power specified in the Constitution ....
Id. at 705; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (Miller, J.):
It is . . . essential to the successful working of this system [of written constitu-
tional law] that the persons intrusted with power in any one of these branches
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so many contemporary commentators betray a profound misun-
derstanding of separation of powers principles, it is important to
review the proper approach to separation of powers issues. Nor
could such a review be more timely: recent challenges to the con-
stitutionality of the independent counsel law3 reaffirm the con-
tinuing significance of separation of powers analysis and high-
light the importance of a proper approach to separation of
powers issues.
Part II of this Article explains how to "think clearly" about
the constitutional requirements for separation of powers. Part
III analyzes specific separation of powers conflicts in the context
of the principles set forth in Part II. For the sake of simplicity,
this Article focuses on separation of powers abuses by the legis-
lative branch." This includes an examination of the interpretive
shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but
that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers
appropriate to its own department and no other.
Id. at 191; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (Black, J.)
("In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Brennan, J.):
[T]he Framers provided that the Federal Government would consist of three dis-
tinct Branches, each to exercise one of the governmental powers recognized by the
Framers as inherently distinct.
As an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and bal-
ances, and as a guarantee of judicial impartiality, Art. III both defines the power
and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch.
Id. at 57-58.
3. Former National Security Council staffer, Lt. Col. Oliver North, and former
White House aide, Michael Deaver, both under investigation by independent counsel, are
contesting the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1978 & Supp. III
1985), on the grounds that it improperly permits the judiciary to exercise executive func-
tions in selecting independent counsel. North v. Walsh, Nos. 87-0457 and 87-0626
(D.D.C. filed March 12, 1987) (dismissed for lack of ripeness); Deaver v. Seymour, No.
87-0477 (D.D.C. filed March 11, 1987) (denying preliminary injunction), aff'd and re-
manded with instructions to dismiss, No. 87-5056 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 17, 1987) (per
curiam).
4. Of course, it is recognized that from time to time the executive and judicial
branches are guilty of separation of powers abuses as well. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet,
343 U.S. at 587-88 (presidential seizure of most of the nation's steel mills was not au-
thorized by a constitutional or statutory grant of power to the executive branch and
encroached upon legislative authority); American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 604 F.
Supp. 1398 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom., Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986). In American Cetacean, the
district court held that the Secretary of Commerce had a nondiscretionary duty, under
1987]
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tools that should be used in determining whether an act of gov-
ernment comports with prescriptions and proscriptions found in
the Constitution for the separate powers of government. This
Article concludes in Part IV by affirming the need for a strict
interpretation of the text of the Constitution when analyzing
separation of powers issues.
II. Thinking Clearly About Separation of Powers
The concept of separated powers as a political doctrine has,
of course, existed at least since the middle of the seventeenth
century.5 Of the various theorists who wrote of the need to di-
vide governmental powers among different institutions, Montes-
quieu most influenced the Framers. However, it would be a mis-
take to assume that Montesquieu's view of separation of
powers - or any other particular view, for that matter - was
specifically incorporated into the Constitution or intended to
dictate our understanding of the constitutional structure of our
government.7 Whatever theories may have influenced the Fram-
ers, only one specific formulation found expression in the Con-
the Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act,
to certify to the President that Japanese nationals were engaged in sperm whaling opera-
tions in such a manner as to "diminish the effectiveness" of the zero quota established
by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Id. at 1404, 1410-11. The
court ordered the Secretary to certify Japan notwithstanding an executive agreement
between Japan and the Secretary, whereby the Secretary promised that the United
States would not certify Japan under the Amendment if Japan pledged to adhere to
certain harvest limits and to cease commercial whaling by 1988. Id. at 1404. In reversing
the district court, the Supreme Court found that the district court misconstrued the
statutory language and legislative history of the Packwood Amendment, which clearly
made the Secretary's certification obligations discretionary. American Cetacean, 106 S.
Ct. at 2868-72.
The Court further commented that although the judiciary may review some issues
that affect foreign relations, the political question doctrine prohibits judicial review of
other cases "which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitution-
ally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive
Branch." Id. at 2866.
5. W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 9 (Tulane Studies in
Political Science No. IX, 1965). Some have even traced the concept of separated powers
back to Aristotle. Id. at 5.
6. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324-28 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See
also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (recognizing the
celebrated status of Montesquieu on the issue of separation of powers).
7. See L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
10 (1985); C. PRITCHETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 13 (1984).
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stitution. Thus, as a jurisprudential matter, there is neither need
nor warrant for reliance on abstract conceptual theories about
separation of powers divorced from the actual text of the
Constitution.'
The United States government is "one of delegated, limited
and enumerated powers."9 All the powers of the national govern-
ment are conferred by the Constitution, and those not expressly
delegated to it are reserved to the States, or to the people.10 The
Constitution distributes the sum total of national government
power among the three branches, stating that "[a]ll legislative
Powers .. .shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives";
that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America"; 2 and that "[t]he judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time or-
dain and establish.' 1 3 Thus, by its own terms, the Constitution
makes clear that the executive and judicial branches have no
legislative power; that no part of the judicial power is conferred
on the legislature or the executive; and that only the executive
branch can exercise executive power. 4 Our system of govern-
8. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) ("The principle of separation of powers
was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into
the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787."); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("To
be sure, the content of the three authorities of government is not to be derived from an
abstract analysis .... The Constitution is a framework for government.").
9. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1882). See generally McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
10. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
12. Id. art. II, § 1.
13. Id. art. III, § 1.
14. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("The
Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into
three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as pos-
sible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibil-
ity."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) ("[Tlhe 'judicial Power . . .'
vested in the federal courts by Art. III ... of the Constitution can no more be shared
with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the
Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override
a Presidential veto."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89
(1952) ("In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.... The Founders of
1987]
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ment, properly viewed, is not, as one scholar has described it,
"separated institutions sharing powers. 1 5 Rather, it consists of
three branches assigned different powers and responsibilities
that together comprise the full extent of national governmental
power.
The Constitution does not permit a branch of government
to expand its own authority by encroaching upon the powers
conferred on the other branches; nor does an acquiescence in an
unconstitutional exercise of power by another branch establish
that power in the other branch.'" Moreover, beyond those pow-
this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad
times."); Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928):
It may be stated... as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional
system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers con-
ferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power; the exec-
utive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power; the judiciary cannot exer-
cise either executive or legislative power.
Id. at 201-02; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880):
It is . . . essential to the successful working of this system [of written constitu-
tional law] that the persons intrusted with power in any one of these branches
shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but
that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers
appropriate to its own department and no other.
Id. at 191.
15. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 26 (1980 ed.) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).
16. The Supreme Court has been frequently confronted with deciding the constitu-
tionality of one branch's actions when the exercise of power by that branch has been
efficient but not authorized by the Constitution. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-46
(The one-House veto practice, in use for fifty years, was struck down as an unconstitu-
tional violation of art. I of the Constitution, which expressly requires that all bills which
pass the two Houses of Congress must be presented to the President.); Youngstown
Sheet, 343 U.S. at 588-89 (A presidential order to take over and operate steel mills was
found to be an impermissible exercise of the lawmaking power because it infringed on
Congress' power to pass laws "in both good and bad times." The Court stated that the
success of other Presidents in carrying out similar orders did not abrogate Congress'
exclusive authority to make laws.); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 289, 311
(1901) (In striking down a stamp duty imposed on bills of lading on exports from the
United States, the Court explained that the constitutionally prohibited tax could not be
saved on the grounds that previous efforts to impose stamp duties on exports were suc-
cessful.). But cf. Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118-19 (1925) (The Court upheld the
practice of several United States attorneys general of pardoning criminal contempts of
court as a constitutional exercise of the Executive pardon power, even though the judici-
ary also had power to punish criminal contemnors. The Court found that continued leg-
islative acquiescence to this practice supported a determination of constitutionality.);
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 458, 473, 483 (1914) (In upholding a presiden-
tial order withdrawing specified public lands from private acquisition, notwithstanding a
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/2
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ers expressly conferred on the various branches (and such pow-
ers as are implicit in their delegation, or incidental to their exer-
cise), there are no "inherent" powers of national government."7
Thus, neither amorphous concepts of sovereignty, nor the mere
possession of legislative or executive power, or of governmental
power generally, affords a basis for claiming authority to take
action not expressly or implicitly authorized by the
Constitution."
To insist that the separated powers of the three branches
are not shared, however, is not to suggest that these powers may
not at times be focused on the same subject or that they must
operate with absolute independence. For example, the Constitu-
tion confers on the President the power to veto bills "which
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,"
subject to the power of Congress to override that veto by vote of
congressional declaration to the contrary, the Court applied the rule that long-standing
acquiescence in a governmental practice gave rise to a presumption of authority. In view
of this long-standing executive practice of withdrawal of public lands, the Court sus-
tained the presidential order.).
17. Claims to inherent powers should be distinguished from claims to those implied
powers ancillary to an enumerated source of authority in the Constitution. For example,
as the necessary and proper clause of article I, section 8, confirms, Congress has not only
those powers specifically conferred by the Constitution, but such "incidental or implied
powers" necessary to implement the powers given. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See, e.g.,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-14 (1819). A claim to inherent pow-
ers is a claim to the existence of governmental powers not expressly conferred by the
Constitution, but "inherent" in our government, as deduced from the nature of govern-
ments generally. C. PYLE & R. Pious, THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
76-77 (1984). See also SPARKMAN, Checks and Balances in American Foreign Policy, 52
IND. L.J. 433, 442-43 (1977); Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U.L. REV. 19, 25
(1970) (Special issue). Although claims to inherent powers are typically made on behalf
of the executive and legislative branches, claims to federal common law and judicial su-
pervisory authority may also constitute appeals by the judiciary to "inherent" powers.
See, e.g., C. PRIrcHETT, supra note 7, at 284-90 (discussing executive claims to inherent
powers); Monaghan, supra, at 25 (same). See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 37-40
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's holding that, pursuant to
federal common law, the court is authorized to award a damages remedy to victims of a
constitutional violation by a federal agent, despite the absence of any statute conferring
such right). See generally Note, Supervisory Power in the United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 642 (1978) (discussing the supervisory power of the judiciary).
18. See S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 186 (1984) (Such a doctrine
of inherent powers "serves only as a license to ignore the constitutional constraints found





two-thirds of each House;"9 it grants the Senate the power of
consent over treaties and presidential appointments;" it gives
Congress the power to define the jurisdiction of the judicial
branch by virtue of its authority to "ordain and establish . . .
inferior [federal] Courts";2 and it gives the judiciary, by virtue
of its power over cases arising under the Constitution and laws
and treaties of the United States, the power to declare legislative
and executive acts unconstitutional.2 Such duties may require
different branches to study and act upon the same set of circum-
stances. However, in each of these instances, the powers of each
branch remain discrete: the legislature is exercising legislative
power, the President is exercising executive power, and the
courts are exercising judicial power; none of them is "sharing"
its powers with the other branches. Any "sharing" or "blending"
of power relates only to the sharing of the sum of all national
governmental power and the concurrent exercise of power by
more than one branch.
These areas of concurrent but separate responsibility are
the checks and balances built into the constitutional structure of
government. They preserve the independence of the separate de-
partments and provide each branch with the ability to protect
against usurpations of power by the other branches.23 These
checks and balances - i.e., the overlapping application of sepa-
rate powers to common circumstances - are not inconsistent
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
20. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
21. Id. art. III, § 1.
22. Id. § 2. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 197 (1882) (The judiciary
may declare a House committee's investigation "beyond [its] legitimate cognizance.");
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohib-
ited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the govern-
ment; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.
Id. at 423.
See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
23. As James Madison wrote: "[T]he great security against a gradual concentration
of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer
each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist en-





with the constitutional separation of powers. Indeed, they com-
plement the separation of powers: "Without the power to with-
stand encroachments by another branch, a department might
find its powers drained to the point of extinction." '24
Further, adherence to the constitutional requirements for
the separation of powers does not disable government from
functioning effectively, nor preclude the branches from develop-
ing innovative solutions to new and exigent problems, nor man-
date government insensitivity to the changing needs of the na-
tion, as some critics have argued." The constitutional separation
of powers does not preclude such experimentation; it merely re-
quires that each branch operate within the limits of its assigned
powers in achieving its goals." As Justice Jackson stated:
"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure lib-
erty, it also contemplates that the practice will integrate the dis-
24. L. FISHER, supra note 7, at 14.
25. See, e.g., Bator, The Constitution and the Art of Practical Government, 32 Chi.
L. Sch. Rec. 8 (1986). Professor Bator - perhaps a bit hyperbolically - describes the
insistence on close adherence to the constitutional prescriptions for the separation of
powers as a "riot of pedantic separation-of-powers purity." Id. at 12. Claiming that the
separation of powers provisions in the Constitution should be understood simply "as set-
ting out very general guidelines," Professor Bator would interpret these provisions in
light of "a deep notion [of] the necessities of the time," substituting what he calls "con-
stitutional style" for constitutional substance. Id.
However, as another scholar has written:
[B]y pretending that the Constitution can be whatever necessity requires, one
would erode the Constitution's authority by rendering it too shapeless and mallea-
ble to function as a standard for judging events.... As "supreme Law," the Con-
stitution expresses a belief that the nation can plan for contingencies and that the
plans can be more or less supreme. Not everyone agrees. Some... will not believe
that general legal prescriptions can cover contingencies [and] will favor govern-
ment by men and women who have a prudential feel or knack for maneuvering
their way through contingencies, having acquired this special competence either
from God, nature, education, or practical experience.
S. BARBER, supra note 18, at 190-91 (footnote omitted).
26. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976):
Congress could not, merely because it concluded that such a measure was "neces-
sary and proper" to the discharge of its substantive legislative authority, pass a
bill of attainder or ex post facto law contrary to the prohibitions contained in
[section] 9 of Art. I. No more may it invest in itself, or in its officers, the authority
to appoint officers of the United States when the Appointments Clause by clear
implication prohibits it from doing so.
Id. at 135 (emphasis in original).
See also 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTrIoNAL LAW
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 23.38, at 521-22 (1986).
1987]
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persed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity. '2 7
Notwithstanding the constitutional requirements of "sepa-
ration of powers" which spell out what each branch can and can-
not do, certain policy choices are open to the branches of gov-
ernment to do what each determines is best for the government
as a whole. For example, it is perfectly legitimate for the execu-
tive or legislative branch" to decide, as a policy matter, to use
restraint in the exercise of its powers so as to avoid conflicts or
confrontations with the other branches, or to seek increased co-
operative decisionmaking with the other branches.29 As long as
constitutional powers and functions themselves are not blended,
cooperative interaction among the political departments of gov-
ernment does in fact seem desirable. Thus, although participants
in separation of powers conflicts may assume that there is al-
ways an institutional "duty" to seek to expand the powers of
their respective branches, such an assumption should be re-
27. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
28. To some extent, the courts also may avoid separation of powers conflicts through
the exercise of restraint in the decision of cases. For example, although courts may not
refuse to decide valid cases or controversies, if a case can be decided upon two
grounds - one involving a constitutional question, and the other a question of statutory
or general law - the courts, to accord due deference to the other branches of govern-
ment that have spoken on a constitutional issue, ordinarily will refrain from passing on
the constitutional question. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)
("[The courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given."); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323
U.S. 101, 105 (1944); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947); Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
29. Thus, for example, the present Administration has issued a directive to all exec-
utive departments and agencies announcing that the assertion of executive privilege in
response to congressional requests for information "will be [made] only in the most com-
pelling circumstances, and only after careful review demonstrates that assertion of the
privilege is necessary." Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies from Ronald Reagan 1 (Nov. 4, 1982). Recognizing that good faith negotiations
between Congress and the executive branch historically have minimized the need for
invoking the privilege, and should continue as the primary means for resolving conflicts,
the directive goes on to state that "[t]o ensure that every reasonable accommodation is
made to the needs of Congress, [the] executive privilege shall not be invoked without
specific Presidential authorization." Id. The memorandum then lists procedures to "be
followed whenever Congressional requests for information raise concerns regarding the
confidentiality of information sought." Id. at 1-3.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/2
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jected. Members of each branch should seek not only to preserve
the ability of their branch to exercise the powers and functions
granted it by the Constitution, but should also observe and reaf-
firm the Constitution's limits on the scope of those powers.
While this attitude is devoutly hoped for among our public offi-
cials, ultimately, the preservation of the constitutional structure
of separate powers is dependent not upon such exercise of wis-
dom by our elected and appointed leadership, but upon the con-
stitutional institutions of checks and balances.
In sum, the Framers chose our structure of government, for
all its inefficiencies, the better to secure liberty and to guard
against tyranny.30 A clear understanding of the constitutional re-
quirements for separation of powers is necessary to ensure that
the purposes sought to be achieved by the division of national
governmental power among three branches are protected and
preserved.
III. Separation of Powers Conflicts
Separation of powers violations may occur in a variety of
ways. Essentially, however, such violations fall into one of two
categories: 1) "[o]ne branch may interfere impermissibly with
the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned func-
tion" by inserting itself into the operation of another branch's
duties; or 2) one branch, acting alone, may assume "a function
that more properly is entrusted to another."'31 Whether an act of
government is valid or invalid under these criteria is determined
by reference to the text of the Constitution, not by resort to gen-
eralizations about the balance of governmental power or theoret-
30. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 51 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("The regu-
lar distribution of power into distinct departments - the introduction of legislative bal-
lances [sic] and checks - the institution of courts composed of judges, holding their
offices during good behaviour.., are means, and powerful means, by which the excellen-
cies of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or
avoided."); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("The ac-
cumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands ... may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."). See also Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.
Ct. 3181, 3186 (1986) ("The declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of
government... was to 'diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty.' ") (citation omitted)
(alteration in original).
31. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983) (Pow-




ical separation of powers principles.
A. Interference by One Branch with Another Branch's Per-
formance of Its Constitutionally Assigned Function
There are several major areas of recurrent conflict between
the executive and legislative branches. One of the most frequent
conflicts is Congress' intrusion upon the management and
prosecutorial responsibilities of the executive through use of its
oversight powers. Another recent example of conflict is the un-
constitutional use of legislative vetoes to retain continuing con-
trol over authority delegated to the executive branch.
1. Congressional Oversight-Interference with Prosecu-
tions
Implicit in the grant of legislative power in article I is the
power to acquire information to determine whether to enact new
laws; to determine whether existing laws are still necessary or
need revision; to determine how the executive branch is enforc-
ing the laws; and to expose corruption, inefficiency, and waste in
the administration of the laws.2 The theoretical scope of the
power of inquiry is as broad and far reaching as the potential
power to enact laws and appropriate funds under the
Constitution."
This power of inquiry, however, is not unlimited. It must be
exercised in aid of legitimate legislative functions, 4 and cannot
be used to arrogate to Congress functions allocated by the Con-
stitution to the executive or judicial branches.3 5 Nor can Con-
32. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); McGrain v. Daugh-
erty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-77 (1927).
33. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
34. "The subject of any inquiry always must be one 'on which legislation could be
had.'" Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975) (cita-
tion omitted). Furthermore, congressional committees and subcommittees conducting
oversight investigations are restricted to the missions delegated to them through author-
izing or enabling resolutions. "No witness can be compelled to make disclosures on mat-
ters outside that area." Watkins, 354 U.S. at 206. See also Gojack v. United States, 384
U.S. 702, 714-16 (1966).
35. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111-12; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. See generally Kil-
bourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). See also L. FISHER, supra note 7:
Were Congress to seek information concerning a pardon, the President could de-
cline on the ground that the matter is solely executive in nature and of no concern
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gress' power of inquiry negate the President's constitutional re-
sponsibility for managing and controlling affairs committed to
the executive branch."' Thus, for example, it is clear that legisla-
tive interference with executive duties - such as open criminal
investigations, prosecutions, or other pending litigation -
which are derived from the constitutional mandate that the Ex-
ecutive "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed""7 is be-
yond the scope of permissible oversight.3 8
One of many examples of congressional overreaching in this
area was the recent attempt by the Subcommittee on Adminis-
trative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary to require the Department of Justice to produce docu-
ments from its files relating to a newly reopened criminal inves-
tigation of alleged false shipbuilding claims filed with the Navy
by the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics. The Sub-
committee sought to subpoena sensitive Department documents
from its investigative files while the matter was under active in-
vestigation before a sitting grand jury. 9
to Congress.... The President need not disclose to anyone in Congress the details
of a treaty being negotiated. He may do so to enlist the support of legislators, but
the invitation is voluntary on his part. He does so for political, not constitutional,
reasons. Nor is the President under any obligation to share with members of Con-
gress the plans of tactical military operations.
Id. at 205-06 (footnote omitted).
36. Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161-64 (1926) (The President's
power to remove, like his power to appoint, was found to be important to his ability to
carry out his constitutional duties and, therefore, was not subject to legislative approval.)
with United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (Recognizing the interests of both
the legislative and judicial branches in fulfilling their constitutional duties, the Court
balanced the legislature's power of inquiry against the President's executive privilege
and upheld an order for in camera review of Presidential documents.).
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
38. The Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976), recognized
that the prosecution of criminal, civil or administrative violations is quintessentially an
executive function.
39. In conjunction with the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance and Se-
curity Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, the Subcommittee on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure also sought documents relating to closed investigations of
alleged false claims against the Navy by Lockheed and Newport News Drydock and
Shipbuilding Company, a subsidiary of Tenneco, Inc. The Department agreed to turn
over all material regarding these investigations that were not protected against disclosure
by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e). Letter from Assistant Att'y Gen. Stephen
S. Trott to Subcommittee on Admin. Practice and Procedure, Comm. on the Judiciary 1-
2 (Oct. 4, 1984) [hereinafter Trott Letter]. The Department also agreed to make availa-
ble materials in the Electric Boat case "on the same basis" once the investigation in that
13
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Consistent with longstanding executive branch practice, the
Department declined to provide such documents on two
grounds: 1) many of the documents sought constituted grand
jury materials within the meaning of Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prohibits the Department
from disclosing matters occuring before a grand jury; and 2) the
"constitutionally mandated separation of the executive and leg-
islative functions" required those files not protected by Rule
6(e) to be held in confidence until the close of the investigation
in order to preserve the credibility and integrity of the Depart-
ment's prosecutorial and investigative operations. Premature re-
lease of the material from the investigative file could have dam-
aged the confidence and cooperativeness of witnesses, the
integrity of the case development, the independence of prose-
cutorial decisions, and the strategy of future prosecution.'0
Without articulating any basis for disagreement with the le-
gal position taken by the Justice Department, the Subcommittee
continued to press for release of documents pertaining to the
Electric Boat investigation, threatening to "do whatever it must
to enforce its subpoena" if its requests were not honored.4 After
several more attempts to reach an accommodation, the Depart-
ment ultimately agreed to turn over documents from its closed
investigative files on Electric Boat, after redacting Rule 6(e) ma-
terial, despite the belief that those documents were pertinent to
case was closed. Id. at 4.
40. The Department consistently refused the disclosure of such statements. Trott
Letter of Oct. 4, supra note 39, at 3-4. See, e.g., Position of the Executive Department
Regarding Investigative Reports, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 45 (1941):
It is the position of this Department, restated now with the approval of and
at the direction of the President, that all investigative reports are confidential
documents of the executive department of the Government, to aid in the duty laid
upon the President by the Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed," and that congressional or public access to them would not be in the
public interest.
Disclosure of the reports could not do otherwise than seriously prejudice law
enforcement. Counsel for a defendant or prospective defendant, could have no
greater help than to know how much or how little information the Government
has, and what witnesses or sources of information it can rely upon. This is exactly
what these reports are intended to contain.
Id. at 46.
41. Statement of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure ac-




the ongoing investigation. The Subcommittee thereafter did not
insist on documents from the Department's open investigative
files.
The dispute over the Electric Boat files illustrates how diffi-
cult it may sometimes be for members of one branch - even
Senators normally sensitive to such issues - to recognize the
danger to separation of powers principles involved in the pursuit
of certain institutional goals. In this case, congressional efforts to
obtain access to information pertinent to ongoing criminal inves-
tigations seriously threatened to impinge upon authority vested
by the Constitution in the executive branch. Article II of the
Constitution places the power to enforce the laws squarely in the
executive branch of government. The Executive therefore has
the exclusive authority to enforce the laws adopted by Congress,
and neither the judicial nor the legislative branches may en-
croach upon that authority by interfering with the prosecutorial
discretion of the executive branch.2 The executive branch has
an obligation flowing from the due process clause to insure that
the fairness of its decisionmaking with respect to its
prosecutorial function is not compromised by excessive congres-
sional pressures. As the Supreme Court once stated: "It is the
peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for
the government of society; the application of those rules to indi-
viduals in society would seem to be the duty of other
departments.' '43
For similar reasons, the executive branch has opposed pro-
posed legislation to amend Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to permit congressional access to grand jury
materials." Congressional access to Rule 6(e) materials would
not aid the Executive in fair and efficient enforcement of the
laws, but would interfere with the Executive's duty to enforce
the law. Therefore, the Department of Justice has taken the po-
sition that "it would be inconsistent with both the separation of
powers and due process clauses for Congress to become a part-
42. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 454, 456-57 (1869).
43. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).




ner in an investigation through its access to 6(e) materials.""5
2. Legislative Vetoes
Until 1983, Congress for six decades often sought to inter-
fere with executive branch responsibilities through use of legisla-
tive veto provisions in legislation delegating administrative and
other authority to the Executive.46 In the legislative veto's most
common form, executive branch decisions could be reversed,
within a specified time period, by a disapproval resolution of one
or both Houses of Congress, or sometimes even a committee. Ad-
vocates of legislative vetoes found them to be pragmatic, effi-
cient accommodations between the two branches by which Con-
gress was willing to give broad discretion to the Executive in
exchange for retaining the opportunity to review and disapprove
the Executive's exercise of that discretion. They argued that in
determining the constitutionality of the legislative veto, "[o]ne
must consider not only the technical constitutional arguments
[that] bear on the legitimacy of the veto, but ... also . . .the
institutional relationships within which the veto operates. '47
Judged in this light, advocates contended, such vetoes were con-
sistent with the aims of the separation of powers doctrine be-
cause they helped maintain the balance of power between the
two political departments of government. 8
Opponents, on the other hand, argued that the legislative
veto violated specific constitutional provisions prescribing the
participation of both Houses of Congress in the exercise of the
lawmaking power,49 requiring presentment of legislation to the
President, 0 and precluding congressional participation in the
45. Letter from Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. Phillip D. Brady to Honorable Strom
Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 10 (Oct. 22, 1985).
46. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
47. Abourezk, supra note 1, at 325.
48. See generally Abourezk, supra note 1; Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto
and the Constitution, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 467 (1962); Javits & Klein, Congressional
Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455
(1977); Miller & Knapp, supra note 1; Schwartz, Legislative Veto and the Constitu-
tion - A Reexamination, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 351 (1978). See also Bator, supra note
25, at 11.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7.




execution of enacted law.61 The bicameral requirement and the
presentment clauses of the Constitution serve an essential con-
stitutional function in preserving the balance of power between
the legislative and executive departments. Moreover, once Con-
gress has made its policy judgment by enacting a law, the legis-
lative function comes to an end; the Constitution vests the im-
plementation of that policy in the Executive. Accordingly,
opponents argued, legislative vetoes were inconsistent with the
scheme for maintaining the separation of powers spelled out in
the Constitution.2
Opponents also asserted that by enacting open-ended dele-
gations with legislative vetoes, Congress was shirking its respon-
sibilities: Congress should be dutybound to pass statutes that
contain precise delegations limited by clear standards. 3 The leg-
islative veto permitted Congress to avoid direct legislative re-
sponsibility for crucial policy choices by allowing it to react to
perceived agency abuses without imposing a concomitant duty
to enact more detailed statutory standards to guide future
agency actions. 54
In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha,a5 sided with opponents of the legisla-
tive veto and held the device unconstitutional. Concentrating on
the procedural requirements of the Constitution, Chief Justice
51. The Constitution declares that the executive power shall be vested in the Presi-
dent, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; and grants the Executive exclusive authority to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. § 3.
52. See, e.g., Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Serv. at 26-34, 44-56,
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-
2170, 80-2171); Motion for Leave to File and Brief of American Bar Association as Ami-
cus Curiae at 7-15, 21-22, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, 80-2171); Brief of Certain Members of the United States
House of Representatives, Amici Curiae at 10-11, 23, Immigration and Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, 80-2171); Bruff & Gellhorn,
Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1373-74 (1977). For a more thorough discussion of legislative vetoes,
see generally Dixon, The Congressional Veto and the Separation of Powers: The Execu-
tive on a Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Re-
sponsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982).
53. See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of American Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae at 23-26, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, 80-2171); Martin, supra note 52, at 288-90.
54. See Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 52, at 1427; Martin, supra note 52, at 289-90.




Burger wrote for the Court that every legislative action requires
bicameral congressional action and presentment to the Presi-
dent.56 The Court defined "legislative action" broadly to include
all actions with the "purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons, including ... Executive
Branch officials ... outside the Legislative Branch. '6 7 The legis-
lative veto not only failed to comport with the procedures which
Congress was constitutionally obligated to follow in passing leg-
islation, it impermissibly interfered with the President's role in
the lawmaking process by denying him the opportunity to veto
legislation.
Notwithstanding Chadha, the debate over the legislative
veto has continued. The current issue is whether Congress can
accomplish the goals of the legislative veto using constitutional
means. The most common proposal is for legislation that re-
quires the executive branch to notify Congress of certain actions
and thereafter to wait a specified period before implementing
those actions in order to allow Congress to pass a joint resolu-
tion of approval, or disapproval, which would be presented to
the President. One observer has stated that "[tihese so-called
'report and wait' requirements were recognized by the Supreme
Court in Chadha as a constitutionally acceptable alternative to
the legislative veto."65 However, Congress continues to enact
"statutory mechanisms ... to control current, planned, or pro-
posed executive actions" that suffer from the same infirmities as
the legislative veto."0 For example, Congress has passed a num-
ber of appropriations acts after Chadha that include provisions
empowering the Appropriations Committees of both Houses to
approve or disapprove certain expenditures of funds without
participation by both Houses of Congress and presentment to
56. Id. at 946-51.
57. Id. at 952.
58. Id. at 951-52.
59. Letter from Att'y Gen. William French Smith to Honorable George Bush, Presi-
dent of the Senate 6 (Nov. 21, 1984) (citing Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2783) [hereinafter DOJ
CICA Letter]. See also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 935 n.9. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1941) (Congress was authorized to review the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure before they became effective without violating the Constitution.).
60. Kaiser, Congressional Control of Executive Actions in the Aftermath of the
Chadha Decision, 36 AD. L. REv. 239, 243 (1984).
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the President.6 1 The President has objected vigorously to the in-
clusion of such committee veto provisions in appropriations bills
and has urged Congress not to include them in the future.2
3. Congressional Impediments to Executive Branch
Management
Over the years, Congress has placed all types of restrictions
in appropriations and other bills that limit the flexibility of the
President and his agency heads to manage the government. Per-
haps the most egregious example during recent years was the
enactment of provisions in the Competition in Contracting Act
of 1984 (CICA)6 3 granting the Comptroller General the authority
to lift the stay automatically imposed under CICA when a bid
protest is filed,"" and purporting to authorize the Comptroller
General to make binding awards of attorneys' fees and bid prep-
aration costs to successful bid protesters.6 5
The Department of Justice refused to defend the constitu-
tionality of these provisions because they authorize the Comp-
troller General, a legislative officer,6 6 to act in an executive ca-
pacity by making binding decisions regarding the bid protest
process.6 7 As a practical matter, the Comptroller General could
effectively suspend any procurement indefinitely simply by de-
61. Id. at 240, n.4, 243-44.
62. See Department of Housing and Urban Development - Independent Agencies
Appropriation Act, 1985, 20 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 1039-40 (July 18, 1984) (objecting
to the inclusion of seven such legislative veto devices in the 1985 appropriations bill for
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)). See also American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (declaring appropria-
tions committee veto provision in earlier HUD appropriation bill unconstitutional).
63. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 was enacted as part of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
64. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c), (d) (Supp. III 1985).
65. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
66. The Comptroller General's post and duties and the General Accounting Office
that he directs, were established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, §§ 301-302,
31 U.S.C. §§ 701-779 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Act gives the Comptroller General the
authority to investigate the receipt and disbursement of public funds and to settle and
adjust all claims and accounts of the federal government. See id. §§ 712, 3526, 3702
(1982). Although the President has the power to appoint the Comptroller General, Con-
gress may remove him for statutorily specified cause. See id. § 703(e)(1) (1982). This
power of removal makes the Comptroller subservient to Congress and therefore an agent
of the legislative branch. See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct, 3181, 3191 (1986).
67. See DOJ CICA Letter, supra note 59, at 5, 9.
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laying his decision on a bid protest for an indefinite period. Such
authority amounts to a power that, in the words of the Supreme
Court, has the "effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and re-
lations of persons . . .outside the Legislative Branch." ' 8 In our
view, as a constitutional matter, there is little difference between
this power and the power of a legislative veto.
The provision permitting the Comptroller General to award
costs against a federal agency, including attorneys' fees and bid
preparation costs, to a prevailing protester, suffers from a simi-
lar constitutional infirmity. This is because by purporting to vest
in the Comptroller General the power to award damages against
an executive branch agency, Congress has attempted to give its
agent the authority to "alter the legal rights, duties, and rela-
tions of persons .. .outside the Legislative Branch."6 9 When
Congress takes such actions, it must do so by passing a law and
submitting it to the President in accordance with the present-
ment clauses. °
It is also eminently arguable that the Comptroller General's
authority to overrule the determinations of an executive branch
agency and to assess costs and damages against it is judicial in
nature, and belongs more properly to the judicial branch.7 1 If so,
"Congress may no more exercise [such power] than it may exer-
cise executive authority. 71 2
Despite these concerns, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,73
has upheld the constitutionality of CICA's stay provisions as
consistent with the principles of the separation of powers.7 4 It
concluded that Congress may legitimately investigate executive
68. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
69. Id.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
71. See DOJ CICA Letter, supra note 59, at 8; See also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 964-65
& n.8 (Powell, J., concurring) (wherein a similar argument, that the legislative review of
an executive decision was an unconstitutional assumption of judicial duties by the legis-
lature, was addressed).
72. DOJ CICA Letter, supra note 59, at 8.
73. 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986).
74. Id. at 42-43. Because the Comptroller General had declined to order reimburse-
ment of Ameron's costs, and because Ameron made no claim for reimbursement in its
complaint, the court concluded that the constitutionality of CICA's fee provision was not




conduct in administering the procurement laws without enacting
legislation and could properly delegate such investigative au-
thority to one of its agents. Thus, "[aibsent a usurpation of ex-
ecutive authority, or an unconstitutional interference with it, the
Comptroller [General's] actions pursuant to CICA [in the court's
view] represent[ed] a proper exercise of congressional [oversight]
authority.""'
The court found that CICA's stay provisions did not author-
ize the Comptroller General to usurp executive authority
because
[t]he only grant of power to the executive [branch] in CICA [was]
the right, under certain circumstances, to override the ninety day
stay or any extension thereof which the Comptroller General
might impose. CICA [did] not grant... authority to the Comp-
troller General to dictate how the executive [exercised its] author-
ity to override the stay. 6
The court also found that CICA did not otherwise authorize
the Comptroller General to execute the procurement laws for
three reasons. First, execution of the procurement laws involved
making decisions about the time and price of purchases, and
from whom those purchases could be made. Further, the Comp-
troller General, was authorized to consider only the length of
time necessary to resolve a bid protest when deciding whether to
extend or shorten the stay. Second, even if the Comptroller Gen-
eral decided that more time was necessary, the executive was not
always required to obey the Comptroller General's extension of
the stay;"7 and third, the executive was free to ignore the Comp-
troller General's recommendation on the merits of the protest."
75. Id. at 993.
76. Id. at 994.
77. Id. at 995. Before a purchase decision has been made the statute permits over-
ride of the stay if "urgent and compelling circumstances which significantly affect inter-
ests of the United States will not permit waiting for the decision of the Comptroller
General." 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
78. Ameron, 809 F.2d at 995. The court stated that "[i]f agencies choose not to im-
plement the Comptroller General's recommendations, they are bound only to report
their reasons." Id. at 995 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3554(e)(1)). The statutory provision, how-
ever, states only that "[tihe head of the procuring activity responsible for the solicita-
tion, proposed award, or award of the contract shall report to the Comptroller General, if
the Federal agency has not fully implemented those recommendations within 60 days of




Finally, the court held that CICA did not authorize the
Comptroller General to interfere impermissibly with the Execu-
tive's performance of its procurement duties. Although it ac-
knowledged that the Comptroller General's authority to
lengthen or shorten the stay might affect executive decisionmak-
ing, "a balancing of legislative and executive interests demon-
strate[d] that this interference [was] entirely justified," espe-
cially in light of the fact that "any potential disruption of the
executive function [was] minimal."' More significantly, the
court concluded, "CICA effectuate[d], rather than disrupt[ed],
the 'proper balance' of power between the executive and legisla-
tive branches." 80
In his concurrence, Judge Garth asserted that a reexamina-
tion of the whole statute was unnecessary. He focused only on
"the critical and challenged portion of the legislation, rather
than the entire enactment itself."81 Judge Garth determined
that whether the stay provision was consistent with the constitu-
tional separation of powers turned on "an assessment of the de-
gree of the alleged intrusion into the authority of the coordinate
branch.'82 Concluding that "the very limited power granted to
the Comptroller General under CICA [did] not undermine the
role of the Executive Branch," he determined that the stay
power "[did] not ... violate separation-of-powers principles."s
The problem with the majority and concurring opinions in
Ameron is that neither assesses the validity of CICA's stay au-
thority in light of specific constitutional provisions;8 both rely
tion." 31 U.S.C. § 3554(e)(1) (emphasis added). It does not state that the procuring head
may ignore the Comptroller General's recommendation.
In any event, before the Comptroller General rules on the protest, the statute pre-
vents the contracting agent from awarding the challenged contract, or from allowing per-
formance of a contract already awarded, except in "urgent and compelling circum-
stances" significantly affecting the interests of the United States. Only after the
Comptroller General rules is the agency freed from this statutory restraint. See id. §
3553(c).
79. Ameron, 809 F.2d at 997.
80. Id. at 998.
81. Id. at 1001 (Garth, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 1000.
83. Id. at 1001.
84. The majority refers once to "[tihe President's duty under the Constitution 'to
take care that the laws are faithfully executed,' (which] is accompanied by the grant of




instead on generalized notions about separation of powers to
conclude that the limited intrusion into executive functions oc-
casioned by the stay authority did not unduly upset the balance
of power between the executive and legislative branches and was
therefore constitutional.
In our view, however, the authority vested in the Comptrol-
ler General by virtue of CICA, when analyzed under the actual
text of the Constitution, goes beyond the authority that may be
constitutionally exercised by an agent of Congress. Because the
statute endows the Comptroller General with power to dictate
when - and by delaying decision - even if a procurement
may proceed, it gives him power to "alter legal rights, duties,
and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch."8
As Chadha recognizes, the exercise of such power is constitu-
tionally permissible only through bicameral action by Congress
and presentment to the President."6 The exercise of authority
granted to the Comptroller General under the stay provision of
CICA fails to comport with these requirements.
In addition, the Constitution confers the executive power on
the President,8" and imposes on the Executive the responsibility
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."88 As the
Supreme Court has stated, "[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Con-
gress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of
'execution' of the law. '" 89 Under CICA, the Comptroller General
is empowered to determine whether a particular protest is "friv-
olous," whether it "state[s] a valid basis for protest," or whether
"the specific circumstances of the protest"90 require staying per-
formance of the government's contract for longer than the statu-
tory period. 1 Clearly, the Comptroller General is executing the
law, because in discharging these responsibilities, he interprets
provisions of CICA and must exercise judgment regarding facts
85. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
86. See generally id. at 946-51 (discussing the presentment clause and the principle
of bicameralism as contained in the Constitution and their relationship to one another).
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
88. Id. § 3.
89. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3192 (1986).
90. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985).




affecting the implementation of the Act.9 2 As the Justice Depart-
ment argued in its brief before the Third Circuit, by placing re-
sponsibility for execution of the law in the hands of an officer
who is an agent of Congress, Congress impermissibly retained
control over the execution of the procurement laws and uncon-
stitutionally intruded into the executive function.93
B. One Branch Impermissibly Assumes the Functions of An-
other Branch
Basic to our constitutional structure of government is the
recognition that each branch is supreme "within its own as-
signed area of constitutional duties. '94 Accordingly, no branch,
consistent with the Constitution, may arrogate to itself or to its
officers the powers conferred on the other branches.
1. Congressional Vesting of Article III Power in Non-Ar-
ticle III Judges
In 1978, Congress enacted a comprehensive revision of the
bankruptcy laws called the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978."
Before the 1978 Act, the district courts served as bankruptcy
courts and used "referees" to conduct bankruptcy proceedings.9 6
The referee's final order was appealable to the district court.97
The 1978 Act eliminated the referee system and established a
United States Bankruptcy Court as an adjunct to each district
court.9 8 The judges of this new bankruptcy court were appointed
to office for fourteen-year terms by the President, with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.99 They were subject to removal
by the "judicial council of the circuit" on account of "incom-
92. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
93. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 20-26, Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, Nos. 85-5226 & 85-5377, slip op. (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1986). See also Bow-
sher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
94. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
95. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
96. See Bankr. R. 102, 11 U.S.C. App. § 101.
97. Bankr. R. 801, 11 U.S.C. App. § 101.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III 1985).





petenc[y], misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental
disability."100 In addition, the salaries of the bankruptcy judges
were set by statute '01 and were subject to adjustment under the
Federal Salary Act.102
Although the bankruptcy judges were not accorded the pro-
tections of article III judges,103 the new Bankruptcy Court was
granted jurisdiction over all "civil proceedings arising under title
11 [the Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to cases under
title 11."104 This grant of jurisdiction essentially empowered the
new bankruptcy judges to adjudicate constitutional and state-
created rights. For this reason, the Supreme Court, in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,105 held
the Act unconstitutional as an impermissible incursion into the
judicial power.10 6
The plurality of the Court in Marathon recognized that
Congress retained broad power to prescribe the manner in which
rights that it creates may be adjudicated - including the as-
signment to a non-article III officer of some of the functions his-
torically performed by judges.107 However, it concluded that
Congress could not remove from article III authority matters
falling within the purview of the judicial power - particularly
the adjudication of rights Congress did not create. 08 Because
the Act "removed most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of
the judicial power'" of article III courts over such issues and
vested them in article I adjuncts, Congress impermissibly as-
signed article III power to non-article III officers.109
Two justices concurred in the judgment. They concluded
that the Court need only have decided whether the Bankruptcy
100. Id. at § 152(e).
101. Id. at § 153.
102. 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-61 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
103. See U.S.CoNsT. art. III, § 1: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office."
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. III 1985).
105. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
106. Id. at 87.
107. Id. at 80.
108. Id. at 83-84.




Court's exercise of jurisdiction in this case - involving only a
state law contract claim - was constitutional. Nevertheless, the
concurring justices agreed that to the extent that the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978 allowed non-article III judges to adjudicate
such a claim, the Act violated article III of the Constitution.110
Thus, both the plurality and concurring opinions agreed that the
adjudication of actions, which are traditionally tried by the
courts at common law, was at the core of the judicial power and
that only article III judges could exercise such power.'
2. Congressional Assumption of Appointment Power
The appointments clause of the Constitution' provides in
pertinent part that the President shall appoint, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, all officers of the United States whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for, and that "the Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior officers,
as [it] think[s] proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.' ' 13 In recent years, Con-
gress has attempted to appoint officers of the United States in
violation of the clause."' For example, provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984115 retro-
actively extended the terms of bankruptcy judges whose terms
had expired and thereby unconstitutionally usurped executive
appointment authority.
The 1984 Act created a new bankruptcy court system to re-
place the system established under the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 which had been declared unconstitutional in the Mara-
thon case, and vested the power to appoint bankruptcy judges to
that system in the courts of appeals."" The 1978 Act had con-
tained a four-and-one-half-year transition period before the
bankruptcy court structure under the Act was to take effect. Af-
ter the Supreme Court declared this new structure unconstitu-
110. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 69-70 & n.23; id. at 89-91.
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
113. Id.
114. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127 (1976).
115. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).





tional in Marathon,11 Congress enacted various interim mea-
sures to extend the transition period, the last extension expiring
on June 27, 1984.118
The 1984 Act, however, was not enacted until July 10, 1984.
Therefore, Congress sought to cure the problem of the gap in
service by including section 121(e) to extend the term of all
bankruptcy judges to the day of enactment of the Act if they
were serving when the bankruptcy court emergency authoriza-
tion provisions expired on June 27, 1984." e Section 106(a) ex-
tended these retroactive appointments so that their terms would
expire on the date "four years after the date such bankruptcy
judge was last appointed to such office or on October 1, 1986,
whichever [was] later."' 20
In refusing to defend sections 106(a) and 121(e) of the Act,
the Department of Justice took the position that these provi-
sions violated the appointments clause. 2' The bankruptcy
judges' offices and terms had expired on June 27, and the July
10 retroactive reappointment was an improper congressional
usurpation of the executive branch's appointment power.12 2
To date, no court has embraced the Department's constitu-
tional argument. 23 The courts' constitutional analysis, however,
typically has focused on the reasonableness of the retroactive ex-
tensions of the bankruptcy judges' terms in light of the purposes
of the appointments clause and the aims of the separation of
powers. For example, noting that Congress could constitution-
ally make changes in the duties of any office it creates, including
the length of the term of service, as long as it did not impair the
appointment power, the Fifth Circuit held:
Under the limited circumstances of this case, it is clear that the
117. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
118. Pub. L. No. 98-249, 98 Stat. 116 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-271, 98 Stat. 163 (1984);
Pub. L. No. 98-299, 98 Stat. 214 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-325, 98 Stat. 268 (1984).
119. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 121(e), 98 Stat. 333, 346 (1984).
120. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 106(a), 98 Stat. 333, 342 (1984).
121. See Letter from Att'y Gen. William French Smith to Honorable George Bush,
President of the Senate 1-2 (Sept. 5, 1984).
122. Id. at 4-5.
123. See, e.g., Koerner v. Colonial Bank, 800 F.2d 1358, 1362-66 (5th Cir. 1986);
Tom Carter Enters., Inc. v. Lummis, 44 Bankr. 605, 608 (C.D. Cal. 1984); In re Benny, 44
Bankr. 581, 589 (N.D. Cal. 1984), appeal dismissed, 791 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd on




action of Congress was a constitutionally reasonable change in
the term of an existing office.
The gap was minimal. Its occurrence was plainly accidental
and the response was both consistent with past action and
reasonable.
To the remote extent the Appointments Clause can be said
even to be implicated in this scenario, there was no Congressional
intent to violate it.
Congress did not . . . upset the constitutional symmetry
among the branches.""
The Northern District of California, held that the 1984 Act
was "well within the long established constitutional limits of
Congressional power and [did] not violate the letter or spirit of
the Appointments Clause or the separation of powers doctrine it
embraces. 1 2' The court stated:
[T]he need for "a workable government" justifies the retention of
interim or transitional bankruptcy judges to preserve the bank-
ruptcy system despite the passage of less than two weeks from
the expiration of the 1978 Act until the enactment and effective-
ness of the 1984 Act.
To conclude that Congress' retroactive extension of bank-
ruptcy judges' terms constitutes new "appointments" would ...
be to "trivialize the great historic experience on which the Fram-
ers based the safeguards" of the Appointments Clause. 2
Whether the gap in the bankruptcy judges' terms was acci-
dental, and whether Congress sought to further some desirable
legislative purpose rather than to usurp the functions of a coor-
dinate branch, 12 7 the fact remains that the terms of the transi-
tional bankruptcy judges had in fact lapsed. Once this occurred,
their offices terminated and they ceased to be bankruptcy
judges. In our opinion, they could not again become bankruptcy
judges except by new appointments made pursuant to article II.
Technical? Perhaps. But sections 106(a) and 121(e) of the 1984
Amendments circumvented the strictures of article II by making
124. Koerner, 800 F.2d at 1367 (emphasis added).
125. Benny, 44 Bankr. at 596.
126. Id. at 597-98.
127. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)
("The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the




bankruptcy judges officers of the United States once more, even
though their selection was accomplished by neither of the meth-
ods prescribed in the appointments clause, but rather by legisla-
tive command. As a result, Congress had assumed for itself func-
tions delegated by the Constitution to the other two branches. "
3. Federal Balanced Budget Act
Perhaps the most recent example of congressional assump-
tion of executive powers occurred in the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman)."'
Gramm-Rudman imposes a ceiling on the federal deficit for each
fiscal year from 1986 to 1991.130 The Act directs the Comptroller
General to review reports submitted by the Directors of the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and, on the basis of those reports, to calcu-
late and order budget reductions.'' The Act also directs the
Comptroller General to report his conclusions to the President,
who is in turn required to issue an initial "sequestration" order
mandating the spending reductions specified by the Comptroller
General.13 2 Within a certain period, Congress may reduce spend-
ing by legislation to obviate, in whole or in part, the need for the
sequestration order; but if such reductions are not enacted, the
sequestration order becomes effective and the spending reduc-
tions included in that order have to be made. 133
The Act also contains a fallback provision, to take effect in
the event a court may hold the reporting procedures unconstitu-
tional, whereby the directors of OMB and CBO would submit
their reports directly to a Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction,
composed of the entire membership of the Budget Committees
of both Houses. That committee would propose a joint resolu-
128. See Benny, 44 Bankr. at 592-98 (The court examines but rejects the argument
that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers in violation of the appointments clause
when it made its bankruptcy judge appointments retroactive.).
129. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. III 1985).
130. See id. § 901(a)(3). If in any fiscal year the federal deficit exceeds the ceiling by
more than a specified amount, the Act requires across-the-board cuts in federal spending
to reach the targeted deficit level. See id.
131. See id. § 901(b)(1).
132. See id. § 902(a)(1).




tion to both Houses of Congress, which, if enacted, would serve
as the basis for a presidential sequestration order.""
Proponents of the Act's constitutionality argued that de-
spite Congress' power of removal, the Comptroller General was
functionally independent of the legislative branch;1 3 5 that the
duties assigned to the Comptroller General, though involving
him in the interpretation and application of the law, were appro-
priate for an independent agent of government to perform;"3
and that a "technical" separation of powers challenge to the va-
lidity of the Act should not be allowed to nullify a legislative
experiment which sought to address a difficult national
problem. 137
In Bowsher v. Synar,13 however, the Supreme Court held
the Act's reporting provisions unconstitutional.'39 It found that
the duties assigned to the Comptroller General under the Act
required him to exercise judgment concerning facts that affected
the application of the Act, and to interpret the provisions of the
Act to determine what budgetary calculations were required.
These duties "plainly entail[ed] execution of the law in constitu-
tional terms."40 Thus, "[bly placing responsibility for execution
of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act in
the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself,
Congress in effect . . retained control over the execution of the
Act and ... intruded into the executive function."' In contrast
to the arguments advanced by proponents of the Act, the Su-
134. See id. § 922(f).
135. See Brief of Appellant United States Senate at 18-25, Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.
Ct. 3181 (1986) (Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379); Brief of the Speaker and Bipartisan
Leadership Group of the House of Representatives, Intervenor-Appellants at 59-69, Bow-
sher (Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379).
136. See Brief of Appellant United States Senate at 12-13, Bowsher (Nos. 85-1377,
85-1378, 85-1379); Brief of the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the House
of Representatives, Intervenor-Appellants at 13-18, Bowsher (Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-
1379).
137. See Brief of the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the House of
Representatives, Intervenor-Appellants at 18-25, Bowsher (Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-
1379).
138. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
139. Id. at 3192.
140. Id.. The Court reasoned, "[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to imple-





preme Court's separation of powers analysis in Bowsher was
squarely rooted in the Constitution:
The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for
Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution
of the laws it enacts. The President appoints "Officers of the
United States" with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate. .. ."
Once the appointment has been made and confirmed, however,
the Constitution explicitly provides for removal of Officers of the
United States by Congress only upon impeachment by the House
of Representatives and conviction by the Senate. An impeach-
ment by the House and trial by the Senate can rest only on
"Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." A
direct congressional role in the removal of officers charged with
the execution of the laws beyond this limited one is inconsistent
with separation of powers. 42
To cure the separation of powers violation, the Court was
urged to invalidate the provisions of the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921 authorizing Congress to remove the Comptroller
General instead of nullifying the reporting procedures of
Gramm-Rudman. 143 The Court determined, however, that sever-
ance of the removal provisions from the 1921 Act would "recast
the Comptroller General as a [member] of the executive branch
[and] alter the balance that Congress had in mind in drafting
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, [not to mention] a
wide array of other tasks and duties Congress has assigned the
Comptroller General in other statutes."144 The Court therefore
concluded that allowing the fallback provisions to come into
play would more closely effect congressional intent.1 5
IV. Conclusion
This Article has attempted to provide an analytical ap-
proach to understanding our Constitution's allocation of the
powers of national government and to addressing interbranch
conflicts. It presumes that the Constitution is law, the supreme
142. Id. at 3187 (citations omitted).
143. See id. at 3192-93.





law of the land, and that for the Constitution to be authorita-
tive, it must be considered to provide the rules for deciding
when a branch of government can or cannot act. In analyzing
separation of powers issues, our government and our Constitu-
tion is ill-served by resort to abstract conceptual notions about
governmental power; support for any act of government must be
derived from the text of the document itself.
Where the text of a particular constitutional provision is
ambiguous or vague, resort may be had to other sources indicat-
ing the intent of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified its
provisions and amendments, including the actual tripartite divi-
sion of government itself. Of course, the aim of any extratextual
analysis is only to elucidate the meaning of the actual constitu-
tional text at issue.
These rules of construction are justified by the fact that the
Constitution manifests the written will of the sovereign citizens
of the United States - "[we] the people" assembled in the con-
ventions and legislatures that ratified the Constitution and its
amendments - and as such is supreme, restraining all
branches of the government. Indeed, the rationale for judicial
review rests on the fact that we have a written Constitution with
an ascertainable and permanent meaning that is binding upon
all of us, including our judges.14
While these interpretive rules are the same for all constitu-
tional provisions, the bulk of the original Constitution's provi-
sions devoted to the structure of the national government, hap-
pily, speaks in clear, unambiguous terms and may be easier to
interpret than others: "Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it be-
comes a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States."1"" No background inquiry into "purpose" and "intent"
is generally necessary, other than to ascertain that the original
understanding of the terms used comports with the meaning of
these terms today. In fact, as the dissenting opinion in Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service v. Chadha'4" illustrates, inquiry
into more generalized intent in the face of explicit provisions can
146. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 181 (1803).
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
148. 462 U.S. 919, 977-80 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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be dangerous because such inquiries are more easily manipu-
lated than are straightforward textual arguments.
This is not to suggest that determining the validity of an
exercise of power is always easy. Certainly, legitimate differences
of opinion over the scope of each branch's authority will con-
tinue to exist. However, as this Article suggests, the proper ap-
proach to resolving separation of powers disputes must start
with an analysis of the Constitution's provisions establishing the
structure of government and enumerating its powers. First, it
must be determined whether an exercise of government power is
authorized by the Constitution. Second, the exercise of power
cannot violate any limitations found elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion, including such limitations as are implicit in the grant of
specific powers to another branch. Stated somewhat differently,
no branch may impermissibly interfere with the exercise of pow-
ers conferred on another branch or assume for itself powers
committed to another branch.
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